By: Matthew Newell

Matthew Newell — Thu, 17 Nov 2016 06:24:53 +0000

You and I have touched on a matter similar to this in the past, regarding the meaning of ‘death’ in creation. I think it’s hard to make this case strictly on Thomistic grounds. I think a competent and comfortable argument can be made for extending the hope of the general resurrection not just to pets but indeed to every living creature; but on scriptural grounds, not Thomistic. I think such an argument could be made consistent with Thomas in very many respects, but I would expect Thomists to disagree with me.

That said, I would try to begin by doubling-down on Ia IIae, Q6, A2.

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2006.htm

I answer that, As stated above, it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, together with some knowledge of the end. Now knowledge of the end is twofold; perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And such knowledge belongs to none but the rational nature. But imperfect knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the end. Such knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals, through their senses and their natural estimative power.

Consequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to the perfect voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man can, from deliberating about the end and the means thereto, be moved, or not, to gain that end. But imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the imperfect voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once. Wherefore the voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature: whereas the imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even irrational animals.

Reply to Objection 1. The will is the name of the rational appetite; and consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason. But the word “voluntary” is derived from “voluntas” [will], and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will, by way of likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through some kind of knowledge.

I suppose I would try to say something like: it’s precisely that “some kind of knowledge” (per cognitionem aliquam) that breaks open the path for analogy. I would want to go from there to make some kind of claim about the intellect and will of animals that–in our experience of particular animals–might suggest a particularity to their form beyond mere expressions of the general form (instinct). And this particularity would be the “what” that is hoped to see again in the resurrection.

The more one’s language emphasizes instinct, the more one risks drifting into mechanism (and we’re left with Descartes). The more one’s language emphasizes cognitionem aliquam, the more one risks drifting into sentimentalism (and we’re left with animals as people).

But I am diverting this. I’m not sure the argument can be made from texts from Thomas.

Comments on: Wait, so…pets in Heaven? (Part One)

By: Matthew Newell