Digressive Opening
As it happens, the day I read Stephen H. Webb’s latest was also the day my students presented on the Borges short story–which I think is parody as well as homage to its dedicatee, H. P. Lovecraft–“There Are More Things.” The title, of course, is a reference to Hamlet (which, I am happy to report, the students readily traced to its origin and explained). There is a sort of surreality to reading someone’s doubtful speculations on the application of quantitative infinity to deity (hint: doesn’t work well) with Borges, Lovecraft, and the story’s reference to “Hinton’s cubes.” A meander down that side street led to the following remarkable observation:
Where this gets interesting is if we pick up on the suggestion made by Smith, Berkove and Baker, that Flatland is a criticism of the misapplication of reasoning by analogy. They argue that Abbott was keen to critique what he saw as the over-extension of analogical reasoning of which Cardinal Newman, for one, was guilty, and what he saw as the tendency to obscure the linguistic roots of this rhetorical construction. They conclude: ‘Flatland is a cautionary tale about the dangers of the imagination when wrongly applied.’
(source: Flat Charles | The Fairyland of Geometry)
I think I disagree with this criticism, but I’ll have to reread Flatland to find out. For the moment, suffice to say that I thought the juxtaposition of mathematization and the doctrine of analogy was pretty interesting. (Enjoy a picture of Hinton’s cubes!)

(source: Hintonian Cubism (part 1))
Distressingly Obtuse
I keep wondering how Webb gets such a hearing, but then I also keep being reminded by his columns of side-trips and dead-ends in thought–in my thought, at times; more generally, in the history of theology.
The perplexing conclusion of Webb’s latest piece sounds like the sort of thing a Lovecraftian character in a Borges story might well say:
God is like a hypercube whose dimensions, if ever mapped for the purposes of notation, would have no apparent numerical end. If so, then it is not quite accurate to say that God is infinite, but it would make some sense to say that our potential knowledge of God most certainly is.
(source: Is God Really Infinite? | Stephen H. Webb | First Things)
As a rule, of course, any summary “God is like” statement can be expected to turn out badly. This one is odd in two ways, though: Odd in that, if it is intended to represent a traditional understanding of God’s “infinity,” it does so only by obfuscating what it pretends to elucidate; odd in that Webb seems to have unironically concluded that divine self-revelation and human understanding, to say nothing of the divine essence, can be spoken of in a language of quantitative specification.
Please understand: I have myself, repeatedly, objected to the use of “infinity” as an excuse for irrationalism in theology. I have been known, myself, to reject the conventional use of “infinity” in both Calculus and theology. I think “infinity” too often stands in for such disparate notions as “unlimited potential” and “irrational presumption of unlimited magnitude or multitude of actual beings” and “a procedure that theoretically never needs to stop” and “really big” and “currently unspecifiable totality” without clear differentiation in popular discourse. In those thrilling days of yesteryear when I finished my B.A. at the theological hothouse of The Master’s College, my polemics against a simplistic mixture of contemporary evangelicalism and Dordtian Calvinism triggered a relapse of rationalism, during which I would willingly have jettisoned divine aseity [which I had not come to understand properly yet], infinity in time [which I conflated with the simplistic and falsely spatialized “outside time” language that often short-circuits our understanding of the subject], and other teachings which, when read poorly and flatly through a tacit Scotist rejection of analogy and a nominalist account of divine volition, certainly seemed to describe a “God of the philosophers” who resembled the God of the Bible only very distantly. It would take well over a decade for me to not only prefer a confessional, creedal, difficult orthodoxy to a simplistic rationalization, but also to embrace it with understanding and commitment; it would take me a long time to express how many, not merely conceptual, links were fitted in that chain.
He drew me with the cords of love,
And thus He bound me to Him.
And round my heart still closely twine
Those ties which naught can sever
(source: Hymn: I’ve found a Friend, oh, such a Friend)
I have been known to say, even recently, that when “infinity” is conventionally (mis)understood as a quantitative expression, we should probably reject the statement “God is infinite” out of hand: God is One, which is finite; God is Three, which is finite; God is not both One and Three in the same way at the same time, so there is no ground for an irrationalism at the base of our theology. (But of course, God is One in ways that none of His creatures are, both with regard to singularity and unity; and God is Three in ways no group of His creatures can be, not least in that these Three are One!)
When I encounter Webb’s thinking, then, I find myself entering my mental storage unit in search of the old Procrustean Bed I used to make up for God, in my poor hospitality: a reductive framework that forces the whole of theology to shrink to the scale of the quantifiable–a theology which is scandalized by the singular. Continue reading




