Tag Archives: 1998

Goldsmith, Plato, and the Opiate

Here’s another undergraduate paper (senior year at TMC), this one a straightforward thematic reading of Oliver Goldsmith’s The Vicar of Wakefield.  I remember being told, I believe by Dr. Hotchkiss, to enjoy those undergraduate days of such reading and writing, because from graduate school forward there would always be loads of criticism in the way.  He was not wrong.  There are certainly compensations; but there are costs, and the simple pleasure of reading, understanding, and explaining has often been obscured by many another concern for months, even years, on end.

Here, then, something simple, with a lot of little hints (often pretty unformed) of some of the key issues that would recur in my Religion & Literature work:  an anti-dualist theme, coded as suspicion of the “Platonic” here (the Vicar is nothing if not a Boethian, methinks); a very Milton-inflected insistence on “conscience” that provided a few more years of fuel for a misguided, defiant individualism; an interest in the temporal workings of Providence, and the integration of interior with public life.

The Vicar’s Dialectic
A Critical Paper Presented to Prof. John Hotchkiss
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of English Novel (E 405)
by Peter G. Epps
December 15, 1998

The hero of this book . . . is drawn as ready to teach, and ready to obey, as simple in affluence, and majestic in adversity. In this age of opulence and refinement whom can such a character please? Such as are fond of high life will turn with disdain from the simplicity of his country fire-side. Such as mistake ribaldry for humour will find no wit in his harmless conversation; and such as have been taught to deride religion will laugh at one whose chief stores of comfort are drawn from futurity (Goldsmith 305).

In The Vicar of Wakefield, Oliver Goldsmith presents both an easy, comfortable novel—and an horrible picture of a Job scenario acted out in eighteenth-century England. The interesting progression of the Vicar’s reduction from affluence to debtor’s prison, from a happy family to a more-than-decimated one, is told with all the charm of a pious (if somewhat pedantic) rustic. The Vicar and his family, though in many ways caricatures, are at the same time well-developed and likeable characters. Thus the reader’s sympathies are directed to the Vicar, and the points the Vicar makes at the depth of his suffering are as direct and true as the points he makes before it are often fatuous. The Vicar’s progress from affluence to poverty to affluence again is more than just a story, however; it is a learning process, at the end of which the Vicar and those around him have “learned their lessons” and are fit for a Providential change of fortunes once more. Along the way, however, a view of God’s relation to man is presented which is an mixture of truth, error and good intentions. In allowing the Vicar’s theodicy to be the crux of his return to good fortune, Goldsmith sets before the reader an idea and leaves it up to his good judgment to learn from the example, as he makes clear from his own preface (quoted above).

The Vicar’s beginning state, that of unsuspecting and comfortable affluence, is best characterized by simplicity. With his wife and family, frequent visits from neighbors and relatives, and good prospects for the future, the Vicar’s happiness is real but untried. Perhaps the best description of the “good life” for the Vicar can be found in the catalog of “those little rubs which Providence sends”:

My orchard was often robbed by school-boys, and my wife’s custards plundered by the cats or the children. The ‘Squire would sometimes fall asleep in the most pathetic parts of my sermon, or his lady return my wife’s civilities with a mutilated curtesy. But we soon got over the uneasiness caused by such accidents, and usually in three or four days we began to wonder how they vext us (306,7).

The family living is resigned to the Vicar’s wife’s care, while the Vicar bestows his salary to the unfortunate as the family has sufficient wealth to be able to afford such gifts. Thus there is no criticism to be made against the Vicar’s state of affluence, except that in his simplicity the Vicar wants some prudence; which is no grave fault, he never having had need of much. The parson’s plan for managing his parish is charming in its simplicity; he “set a resolution . . . of being acquainted with every man in the parish, exhorting the married men to temperance and the bachelors to matrimony . . . it was a common saying that there were three strange wants at Wakefield, a parson wanting pride, young men wanting wives, and ale-houses wanting customers” (308,9). Surely there is nothing in this to criticize. There is already present, in seedling form, the message which will become the book’s theme: “those little rubs which Providence sends to enhance the value of its favours” (306) are here minor mishaps; later, as the trouble grows and the Vicar learns greater prudence, he will also deepen out this view into an entire theodicy—and an evangelistic message.

The Vicar’s troubles begin when his pedantic pursuit of a minor theological battle ends up barring his son’s marriage; immediately on the heels of this gap between his simplicity and necessary prudence comes the loss of his fortune. Still, in the face of his own principles, the Vicar is honest when he refuses to dissemble until after the wedding. Here a paradox begins to open up. It is obvious that the parson’s scruple over remarriage (after the death, not divorce, of a spouse) is spurious; at the same time, it is obvious that he is right to stick to his conscience, rather than prudential considerations which might press him to dishonesty. This upholding of even a meaningless scruple against strong motives to bend becomes one of the Vicar’s primary characteristics throughout the story.

The descent takes several stages. First, the family is financially driven down into middle-class living, compelled to move to a new parish and take up farming to add to their living. The Vicar presses the family to adjust their standard of living to the new situation, with some success. The temptation to press up to the level of affluence is subdued, and the simplicity of affluence is replaced by a readily discovered sufficiency. In learning to be content with enough, rather than to rely upon the comforts of wealth, the family becomes able to live within its means and to provide for itself well enough.

The next level of the decline is when the family begins to be torn apart by the struggles of maintaining their standard of living, with the various social agendas attached to bourgeois life. From portraits to horses, the family tries to live up to the imagined expectations of those who style themselves better—often over the protests of the Vicar, though he acquiesces in them when he believes they may have some practical benefit. These attachments which seem to have so much promise fall through quickly, and the family are left with only the struggles. As they descend below the middle class toward the lower class, the struggle to hold the family together becomes greater. The desires of each to be more than their present circumstances will allow is difficult for even the Vicar to deny; and a series of unwise attempts to improve their economic condition result only in further losses. The family dissolution continues when Olivia, the oldest girl, elopes with the profligate Squire Thornhill. In pursuing her (by a false trail carefully laid to deceive him), the Vicar exhausts his health and his resources, finds his son George who has been wandering the continent since the loss of funds to support his education, and sees him off to a commission in the Army. Returning home, he finds Olivia nearly dead in an inn near town; he brings her back with him just in time to see the house burn down.

With the burning down of the house, the Vicar’s family begins its slide from the lower class into the underclass. This is completed when the Vicar is cast in debtor’s prison and his family dispossessed of their lands by the Squire, when the Vicar refuses to withdraw his objection to the Squire’s marrying another woman. The social context is complex and largely irrelevant to this exposition: the key fact is that the Vicar is once more standing on a scruple that many would vacate to the prudential considerations that weigh against his stand. In this case, however, it is more than a matter of his beliefs in some arcane theological controversy; it is his daughter’s honor which is at stake. In taking his stand, the Vicar ends up imprisoned, burned from the fire and ill; Olivia is believed dead, Sophia kidnapped; George (the eldest son) is arrested on a capital charge (for challenging the Squire). The dissolution of the family is complete; though the younger sons remain, the underclass pattern of living disrupted by constant chaos and the seducing influence of lower characters has manifested fully.

However, the Vicar remains faithful, preaching to the prisoners until some actually begin to reform their lives; and it is in this context, on the occasion when the misfortunes have been capped by the news of George’s imprisonment, that the Vicar delivers at last the full message which has been weaving itself throughout Goldsmith’s dialectical narrative. In the message, the Vicar distinguishes between philosophical and religious modes of dealing with the pain in the world:

“philosophy . . . tells us that life is filled with comforts, if we will but enjoy them; . . . that though we unavoidably have miseries here, life is short, and they will soon be over. Thus do these consolations destroy each other; for if life is a place of comfort, its shortness must be misery, and if it be long, our griefs are protracted. Thus philosophy is weak; but religion comforts in an higher strain” (437).

The error, according to the Vicar, lies in the shortness of the view; the exigencies of this life cannot be stretched into anything like a fulfilling pattern. Rather, the Vicar advocates an Irenic view of the world’s troubles: “Man is here . . . fitting up his mind and preparing it for another abode” (437). Of course, the Vicar’s religion has more than a little Platonist philosophy in it; he speaks of the “good man” who “leaves the body and is all a glorious mind” (437). Therefore, “to religion . . . we must hold in every circumstance of life for our truest comfort; for if we are already happy, it is a pleasure to think that we can make the happiness unending; and if we are miserable, it is very consoling to think that there is a place of rest. Thus to the fortunate religion holds out a continuance of bliss, to the wretched a change from pain” (437).

It is at this point that the critique becomes applicable; to steal a march from the Marxists, this sort of religion is the “opiate of the masses” if not carefully tempered. It gives to those who are downcast hope in the hereafter rather than temporal hopes, and directs them to accept the exchange as for their benefit. It gives to those who are wealthy and stay within the bounds of religion no direct connection with the well-being of those around them; after all, their concern is with the way they are presently building toward their eternal happiness. However Goldsmith may shape the plot in The Vicar of Wakefield, teaching such as this tends to dull the daily activity of the poor in acquiring means of betterment and the rich in aiding them.

The dialectic is completed; having uttered the whole truth at last, the Vicar is soon delivered from his trials: he is released from prison, finds Olivia alive and Sophia rescued; George is freed; the family is restored to affluence; and Olivia’s honor is upheld. Sophia and George are married, and all is well. Though there is no causal link between the Vicar’s speech and the resolution which immediately follows, the thematic relation is too obvious; having realized the understanding necessary to his fuller appreciation of Providence, the Vicar is Providentially delivered and restored to that simplicity of life—but now with greater wisdom. Thus does Goldsmith, under the guise of a tale, take the reader through the entire development of a worldview; and thus does the Vicar end by saying, “I had nothing now on this side of the grave to wish for, all my cares were over, my pleasure was unspeakable. It now only remained that my gratitude in good fortune should exceed my former submission in adversity” (461).

Goldsmith, Oliver. The Vicar of Wakefield and other writings. (New York: Random House, 1955)

Another Religion Theme

I want to continue this series of bits from my scholarship with a few excerpts that happen to discuss Buddhism (in one case, mostly as a quick stop on the way to Confucianism).

I hasten to point out not only that, being the person I am from the place I grew up in the years I grew up there, my inner sympathy with Buddhist or Confucian thought is a matter of intentional cultivation–cultivation that had just barely begun in the Fall of my senior year as an undergraduate.  I can tell you from a later vantage that half of my generalizations about Buddhism in this early paper are pretty inaccurate, though in a few relevant details they come close to making the point I intend.

Here, then, my undergraduate paper from Dr. Morley’s World Religions class:

THE VIRTUOUS SELF IN BUDDHISM AND CONFUCIANISM:
A COMPARISON IN CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE
A Research Paper
Presented to
Dr. Brian Morley
In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements of
World Religions (BMS 385)
December 2, 1998

The Western mind often conceives of all Eastern thought as a homogenous whole on the model of Hinduism and Buddhism. It is not, however, always so; a number of differing strains of Eastern thought may be contrasted to the Hindu/Buddhist mysticism. Among these variant movements, Confucianism stands in sharp relief against Buddhism; the Confucian concept of the ruler who wishes to “illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the kingdom” by encouraging bonds of filial and national piety is utterly antithetical to the Buddhist search for freedom by non-attachment. The Christian will recognize in the altruistic, public ethic of the Confucian a resemblance to the ethics of the Old Testament Scriptures and of Christ.

In the Buddhist view, the human self is illusion; the notion of self-existence is the barrier to understanding of the truth. Only by learning to reject the illusion of selfhood can a man begin to live in such a way as to become conscious only of truth; by being conscious only of truth, that man escapes samsara, the continuing cycle of death and rebirth occasioned by the karmic effects of desire.

Learn to distinguish between Self and Truth. Self is the cause of selfishness and the source of evil; truth cleaves to no self; it is universal and leads to justice and righteousness. Self, that which seems to those who love their self as their being, is not the eternal, the everlasting, the imperishable. Seek not self, but seek the truth (World Library).

The relationship between right action and self in Buddhism is antagonistic; only by learning to negate self does one achieve “justice and righteousness” which lead to non-attachment and, ultimately, to freedom. As Janwillem van de Wettering says,

Buddhism is negative. It will tell you what it is not. When you insist that it must be something it merely allows for an open space, which you can fill in as you like. It is only specific about its method (Comstock 160).

Because of this negativity, Buddhism in practice resolves into either a basic anti-rationalism coupled with various superstitions or a basic rule-based merit system. In either case, its primary ethical focus is on method; and despite appeals to compassion, it remains that compassion is a part of the method to achieve a given end, which is personal freedom. This internal tension–the desire for a compassionate, ethical life in a metaphysical system which must negate compassion itself–is one of the greatest vulnerabilities of Buddhist thought.

In stark contrast is the Confucian emphasis, which begins with the desire to cause moral excellence to abound:

The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the kingdom, first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things (World Library).

Here the end to be achieved is not escape from the world of existence, but an abundance of virtue within it. The accomplishment of virtue begins with a virtuous ruler who knows that public virtue begins with private cultivation of right thoughts. Here Buddhism and Confucianism briefly meet: both agree that private knowledge of truth is the starting point; but where Buddhism seeks truth in negation, Confucianism seeks truth in “the investigation of things.” Where Buddhism sees self as the enemy of truth, Confucianism sees truth as an understanding of the self and of others which leads to sincerity and right relationships.

This concept of right relationships by self-knowledge and cultivation of virtue is reinforced throughout Confucian writings; it forms “the root” of Confucian ethics. Not only is it the ruler’s duty to pursue and exemplify virtue in his personal, family, social and political life, but all must do so together: “From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of everything besides” (World Library). As a result of this cultivation of the person, men are rightly related to others through all the various social roles they adopt. Referring to the respected ancient King Wan, Confucius notes that

As a sovereign, he rested in benevolence. As a minister, he rested in reverence. As a son, he rested in filial piety. As a father, he rested in kindness. In communication with his subjects, he rested in good faith.
When each knows his own heart, and by investigation understands the hearts of others, he is able to engage in right action. When men are given to understanding, they are able to trust each other; the result is rest, or reverence for the piety which makes for right relationships. The heart of this self-knowledge which makes for right relationships is integrity:
What is meant by “making the thoughts sincere” is the allowing no self-deception, as when we hate a bad smell, and as when we love what is beautiful. This is called self-enjoyment. Therefore, the superior man must be watchful over himself when he is alone.

It is interesting to note that this philosophy makes ethics an aesthetic phenomenon in a way which transcends specific legalities. The man who makes his thoughts sincere is the man who knows himself for what he is and tolerates nothing which is repugnant to his knowledge of the good. In order to carry this beyond the realm of rule-based morality, Confucius invokes the analogy of the “bad smell” which men recoil from and the “beautiful” which men love. This ethic engages the entire man in an effort to create superior moral worth–not simply the negative ethic of commandment-keeping, nor the self-negation of Buddhism or asceticism, but the moral excellence or virtue idealized by the imperial civilizations, by primitive Christianity and by the warrior cultures of Northern and Western Europe. Such an excellence transcends mere physical prowess or mere pristine purity; it is the positive presence of something worthy of admiration, something which ennobles both those who have it and those with sense enough to revere it. The creation of great art, the winning of noble battles, the defense of an honest man’s cause–these are the virtues which all civilizations not degraded by a low view of God’s image in man have sought to exemplify.

The result of this aesthetic ethic is the impulse of the great to “illustrate illustrious virtue” among the peoples of the world. Despite a general optimism, however, Confucius is not silent as regards the evil in man’s heart:

There is no evil to which the mean man, dwelling retired, will not proceed, but when he sees a superior man, he instantly tries to disguise himself, concealing his evil, and displaying what is good. The other beholds him, as if he saw his heart and reins;-of what use is his disguise? This is an instance of the saying -“What truly is within will be manifested without.” Therefore, the superior man must be watchful over himself when he is alone (World Library).

It is in truth not merely a prudent gesture, nor a means to a personal end–in order for public virtue to be worth anything it must be the honest end of private virtue. Confucius here gives elegant form to the old adage, “You can fool some of the people some of the time, and you might even fool most of the people most of the time, but you can’t fool all of the people all of the time”–or, in the words of Scripture, “Be sure your sin will find you out” (Num 32:23). A man’s reputation may in some points deviate from his true character, but those who are discerning will readily discover the discrepancies; and, generally, all men know at a very basic level whether they are seeing an honest man or a deceitful one.

The emphasis on true personal integrity is just one of several points where the Confucian ethical system coincides closely with Scriptural principles. This should not be surprising, however. Confucius, writing circa 500 B.C., never claimed to be original; rather, he was gleaning his knowledge from the ancients, the great rulers of the earth from times now obscured by millenia of conflict and a century of modern historical revisionism. Another great collection of historical wisdom of the ancients can be found in the works of Solomon, who “set [his] mind to seek and explore by wisdom concerning all that has been done under heaven” (Eccl 1:13). In the end, the Preacher attains a simple insight into the basis of all human wisdom: “Fear God and keep His commandments . . . For God will bring every work into judgment, everything which is hidden, whether it is good or evil” (12:13,14). It is this direct theism which is lacking in Confucian thought; yet the basic patterns are the same, implying a common origin. Personal piety on a very basic level becomes the groundwork for right action and right relationships; and the “hidden” or private things will be judged as well as the public.

It is no surprise, then, when Solomon’s method for inculcating these virtues in his people–with a special focus on his own descendants–is similar to that of Confucius. Indeed, in Ecclesiastes Solomon makes clear that he has collated the wisdom of many into his books of sayings:

In addition to being a wise man, the Preacher also taught the people knowledge; and he pondered, searched out and arranged many proverbs. The Preacher sought to find delightful words and to write words of truth correctly.
The words of wise men are like goads, and masters of these collections are like well-driven nails; they are given by one Shepherd (Eccl 12:9-11).

Much of Solomon’s wealth of collected wisdom has been lost to the ages, but one important collection has been preserved in the book of Proverbs. The variety of sources available to Solomon probably included some of the same sources available to Confucius 400 years later; it is tantalizing to consider whether Confucius may have seen Solomon’s writings (as Socrates almost certainly did, having studied Hebrews). It is known that some of Solomon’s proverbs came from others (as, for instance, Agur and King Lemuel); and older copies of virtually identical passages have been found in Egyptian texts.

If one accepts a recent flood, basing ancient chronology as strictly as possible on the Scriptural geneaologies and tables of the nations, then it becomes apparent why each of these collectors of ancient wisdom–and others like them–have such similar thoughts. Not only are these transcendent human ideals; they are also the core elements of a literature which was ancient even in the days of Confucius, Buddha and Socrates. The wise men, patriarchs and rulers of the second and third millennia B.C. would be to Confucius or Solomon as Plato or Aristotle or Cicero are to modern man, only greater. Not only were these ancients of the ancients great thinkers of past days, but they were the very founders of all the world’s civilization: they were the progenitors of all the races, inventors of languages, makers of laws and writers of songs for all peoples. In the post-diluvian patriarchs the earth’s kingdoms were at their fullest and most glorious; only the great apostasy of Babel prevented their creating the golden age of all humanity. Even so, men seeking the original truth which preceded the darkness which those who “illustrate illustrious virtue” wished to dispel would inevitably turn to the writings of those who had known that truth, and to their successors. It is the very similarities between the ancient writers which best confirms the constant presence of God’s revelation, even where the Bible preserves only a skeleton outline of things long past.

Confucian teaching and Solomon’s proverbs are quite congenial in many ways. The teaching on integrity, on the necessity of private virtue to the effective exercise of public virtue, sound very similar to Solomon’s words, when he says, “Watch over your heart with all diligence, for from it flow the springs of life. Put away from you a deceitful mouth, and put devious lips far from you” (Prov 4:23,24). In addition, the efficacy of public virtue is attested repeatedly; one well-known example follows:

When the righteous increase, the people rejoice, but when a wicked man rules, people groan. A man who loves wisdom makes his father glad, but he who keeps company with harlots wastes his wealth. The king gives stability to the land by justice, but a man who takes bribes overthrows it . . . The righteous is concerned for the rights of the poor, the wicked does not understand such concern . . . If a ruler pays attention to falsehood, all his ministers become wicked . . . If a king judges the poor with truth, His throne will be established forever . . . Where there is no vision, the people are unrestrained, but happy is he who keeps the law (Prov 29:2-18).

An Inchoate Apocalyptic Aesthetic

Here’s one from quite some time ago–my junior year at The Master’s College, in fact. I’m going to offer it in as near to its “student paper” form as possible. Some of the very sketchy analysis here formed the basis for both my pursuit of Nineteenth Century Poetry as a field and my eschatologically-oriented approach to H. P. Lovecraft’s fiction in my master’s thesis.

Yes, at this stage I reflexively lumped all “seems evolutionary” lines of reasoning in the “reject” basket, much like at this point in my thinking “seems Catholic” would have been a reason to reject something. We are shaped by many things before we are fully formed, friends!

 

Peter G. Epps
Victorian Age
Dr. Pilkey
5/7/98
Tennyson’s Forward Glance

In Memoriam A.H.H. opens on a note of bleary agnostic resignation, but ends on a nearly apocalyptic affirmation of the glory of God’s rule of creation. In so doing, Tennyson reflects the fact that “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom” but that “the end of the commandment is charity out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and of a faith unfeigned.” Therefore, while his beginning and end both acknowledge the superiority of God and the rightness of his goals, the beginning reflects the fearful insipidity of those who have not come to a right knowledge of God. The conclusion, on the other hand, reflects a fuller understanding of and submission to God’s ability to guide the universe.

The opening lines state flatly Tennyson’s agnostic view of God’s work, where he speaks of a God “Whom we, that have not seen thy face,\by faith, and faith alone embrace,\Believing where we cannot prove.” Further, Tennyson seems able only to acknowledge that God’s arbitrary crushing of man is accompanied by a like arbitrary raising of him; he seems unable to sense any purpose in this. Fear is the key here; it is precisely a lack of faith that makes it so necessary to constantly affirm one’s faith. That which faith truly apperceives is already seen as certain; it is that which one doubts that one must attempt to consciously affirm by faith. It is this state, however, of fearing the consequences of either accepting or rejecting the truth, that allows the Spirit fertile ground to work in men’s lives. In Tennyson’s case, it seems that such a work occurred on some level.

Tennyson acknowledges the need of such a work when he says,

    We are fools and slight;
We mock thee when we do not fear:
But help thy foolish ones to bear;
Help thy vain worlds to bear thy light.

Forgive what seem'd my sin in me;
What seem'd my worth since I began;
For merit lives from man to man,
And not from man, O Lord, to thee.

The constant cry for forgiveness and the almost cringing tone is indicative of one who has not learned confidence in the love and promises of God, who still believes that God is too far beyond human thought to make any ethical standard applicable, or any final understanding possible.

Over the course of the work, however, Tennyson achieves a number of moments of clarity; the finest is in his epilogue. In closing, Tennyson speaks in glowing terms of a final marriage, one reserved for the end of time, which he sees typified in his sister’s marriage. The language is brilliant and full of hope, and the climax comes at the very last:

A soul shall draw from out the vast
And strike his being into bounds,

And, moved thro' life of lower phase,
Result in man, be born and think,
And act and love, a closer link
Betwixt us and the crowning race

Of those that, eye to eye, shall look
On knowledge; under whose command
Is Earth and Earth's, and in their hand
Is Nature like an open book;

No longer half-akin to brute,
For all we thought and loved and did,
And hoped, and suffer'd, is but seed
Of what in them is flower and fruit;

Whereof the man, that with me trod
This planet, was a noble type
Appearing ere the times were ripe,
That friend of mine who lives in God,

That God, which ever lives and loves,
One God, one law, one element,
And one far-off divine event,
To which the whole creation moves.

Of course, it cannot be ignored that Tennyson is powerfully influenced by the growing evolutionary consensus of his day; nor can it be supposed that he had an unclouded vision of the future state. At the same time, there is a powerful image in these lines of the coming man—that which has been missing from the agnostic piety of the Christianity to which Tennyson weakly appealed in his opening lines. It is the same appeal as that which Nietzsche makes when he postulates Ubermensch, the same as the appeal of the Marxist utopian fantasies of the great socialist worker. It is the lost Christian hope of the race which God has spanned time and space to collect, of those whose faith has made them whole by their apprehension of the grace of God in Christ. In the end, it is the hope of the future Sons of God which Tennyson’s poetic fervor envisions; it is the Bride of Christ who meets the Lamb face to face for the first time who exclaims, “Worthy!” in his lines. Tennyson’s hope which subsumes his grief is the knowledge that somehow, in some way, God will raise men above their present pitiful state and make them one with His divine presence in their midst. Recognizing this, Tennyson shakes of his languor and exclaims, affirming in the feast his pleasure and the sense of Hallam’s final glorification.

“For by Him, and through Him and to Him are all things; to whom be glory forever and ever. Amen.”